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Parties to arbitration agreements sometimes invoke the 
judicial system to litigate collateral issues arising out of the 
arbitration process, such as arbitrability of some or all of the 
claims, arbitrator bias, and award enforcement or vacatur.  When 
deciding these collateral issues arising out of securities arbitration, 
courts interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 
1 et seq. (2010) (“FAA”).1  In this chapter, we identify recent 
judicial decisions in the area of arbitration law, and analyze their 
impact on securities arbitration practice. 
 
I. U.S. Supreme Court  
 
 Since the PLI Arbitration Law Update 2010 was published 
last June, the United States Supreme Court has remained very 
active in the area of arbitration law, issuing two opinions 
interpreting the FAA, and granting certiorari on two additional 
cases involving two different defenses to arbitrability (waiver and 
public policy).   
 
A. Who Decides Arbitrability? 
 
 The Supreme Court has observed that the question of “who 
– court or arbitrator – has the primary authority to decide whether 
a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a 
party resisting arbitration.”2  Although the Court has held 
repeatedly “that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a 
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,”3 it has 
reversed that presumption on the question of “who decides” 
questions of arbitrability.  Thus, courts decide substantive 
                                                 
1
 Because securities arbitration necessarily “involves commerce” (FAA § 
2 (2010)), it is deemed under the auspices of the FAA.  See Howsam v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
2
 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).   
3
 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 626 (1985). 
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arbitrability, or “gateway” issues that parties would likely expect a 
court to determine, such as the validity of an arbitration agreement 
itself or the breadth of an arbitration agreement, unless there is 
evidence of the “clear and unmistakable” intention of the parties to 
have arbitrators decide that issue.4  In contrast, arbitrators decide 
questions of procedural arbitrability: those issues “which grow out 
of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.”5   
 
 The Court found such “clear and unmistakable” evidence 
in a decision it handed down at the end of its 2009-10 term.  In 
Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Jackson,6 a 5-4 decision authored by 
Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas 
and Alito, the Court held that an arbitration agreement may validly 
delegate to the arbitrators the power to decide a challenge to 
arbitrability on the grounds of unconscionability, unless the 
unconscionability challenge focuses specifically on the delegation 
provision.  
 
 Respondent Antonio Jackson filed an employment 
discrimination suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in federal district court 
in Nevada against his employer, petitioner Rent-A-Center.  As a 
condition of employment, Rent-A-Center had required Jackson to 
sign a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (“Agreement”) 
which provided, in relevant part, “for arbitration of all ‘past, 
present or future’ disputes arising out of Jackson’s employment 
with Rent-A-Center, including ‘claims for discrimination’ and 
‘claims for violation of any federal . . . law.’”7  The Agreement 
explicitly stated that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or 
                                                 
4
 See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45. 
5
 See, e.g., Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (citation and internal quotation 
omitted) (holding that a federal district court should not interpret the 
NASD six-year eligibility rule because the decision is presumptively 
reserved for the arbitrator). 
6
 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
7
 Id. at 2775. 
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local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any 
dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or 
formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any 
claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”8  
 
 Invoking the Agreement in district court, Rent-A-Center 
moved for an order compelling arbitration of the employment 
dispute.  Jackson opposed the motion, asserting that the Agreement 
was unenforceable as unconscionable under Nevada law because it 
contained an unfavorable fee-sharing arrangement.9  The district 
court found that the Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegated 
to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to determine its 
enforceability, even in the face of an unconscionability challenge.10   
 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.  The Court of 
Appeals held that, when “a party challenges an arbitration 
agreement as unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not 
meaningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of 
unconscionability is for the court.”11 
 
 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding 
that parties may – by agreement – delegate to the arbitrators a 
question of arbitrability.  The Court acknowledged that the FAA 
“places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other 
contracts,” and requires courts to enforce their terms subject only 
to general contract defenses.12  The FAA operates on “an 
additional, antecedent agreement” that delegates to the arbitrators 
                                                 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id.  
10
 Id.  The district court added that it would have rejected the 
unconscionability challenge even if the Agreement had not delegated that 
question to the arbitrators for decision.  Id. at 2776. 
11
 Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(remanding to the district court to determine whether the Agreement was 
unconscionable on grounds other than the fee-sharing arrangement). 
12
 130 S. Ct. at 2776. 
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the authority to decide a “gateway” issue “just as it does on any 
other.”13 
 
 In addition, Jackson had not challenged the delegation 
provision of the Agreement specifically, but rather “opposed the 
motion to compel on the ground that the entire arbitration 
agreement, including the delegation clause, was 
unconscionable.”14  Thus, the Court held that the arbitrator, and not 
the courts, had the authority to consider Jackson’s 
unconscionability challenge.   
 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions under the FAA reflect the 
tension between freedom of contract and arbitrator accountability.  
In Jackson, the Court reinforced its commitment to enforcing the 
terms of an arbitration agreement that demonstrate the “clear and 
unmistakable” intentions of the parties, regardless of how much 
power is ceded to the arbitrators.   
 
B. FAA Preemption 
 
 Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence is that FAA §2 – which declares that agreements to 
arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”15 – preempts state laws that place an arbitration 
agreement on unequal footing from other contracts.16  Where a 
state law prohibits the arbitration of a particular type of claim, 
courts can more readily find FAA preemption.  However, courts 
have struggled where a generally applicable contract defense, such 
                                                 
13
 Id. at 2777-78. 
14
 Id. at 2779. 
15
 9 U.S.C. §2.  The latter phrase of this section is known as the FAA’s 
“savings clause.” 
16
 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996).   
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as unconscionability, was arguably being applied in a manner that 
was de facto disfavoring arbitration.   
 
 The Court faced this question in its second arbitration law 
decision in the past year.  In AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 
the Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank 
rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in 
consumer contracts as unconscionable.”17   
 
 In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T 
Mobility, LLC (“AT&T”) included a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs from bringing 
class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated 
on an individual basis.  In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in 
district court, alleging that AT&T’s practice of charging sales tax 
on a phone advertised as “free” was fraudulent.18  In December 
2006, after the Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the 
arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T would pay a customer 
$7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on 
the merits of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the last 
AT&T settlement offer.19  Two years later, after the Concepcions’ 
case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter 
alia, identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved 
to compel arbitration under the revised agreement.20   
 
 The district court refused to enforce the arbitration 
agreement under FAA §2’s savings clause.  The court concluded 
that the class action waiver of the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions 
                                                 
17
 131 S. Ct. 1740 (Apr. 27, 2011). 
18
 Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009).  
Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006.  
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
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and the efficient resolution of third party claims.21  After the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, on an interlocutory appeal, the district court’s 
conclusion that the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable 
and that the FAA did not preempt the Discover Bank rule,22 AT&T 
sought review in the Supreme Court.  
 
 On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, 
in which Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and 
Alito) authored a plurality opinion and Justice Thomas authored a 
concurring opinion, held that the FAA preempts California’s 
Discover Bank interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule.  
The Court concluded that the Discover Bank rule created a 
different law of unconscionability for class action waivers in 
adhesive arbitration contracts.23  Thus, the FAA preempts the rule, 
as it singles out arbitration clauses for suspect treatment.24   
                                                 
21
 Id. 
22
 Id. at 853-55, 856-69. 
23
 The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may 
refuse to enforce a contract that it finds “‘to have been unconscionable at 
the time it was made,’” or it may “‘limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause,’” 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 
§ 1670.5(1) (1985)).  “A finding of unconscionability requires a 
‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on 
‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on 
‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”  131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citations 
omitted).  In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 
2005), the California Supreme Court applied this unconscionability law 
to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held: 
 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the 
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts 
of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with 
the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money, 
then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property 
 8
 
 The Court rejected the Concepcions’ argument that the 
Court should defer to the California Supreme Court’s analysis of 
its own unconscionability doctrine and instead use an objective 
determination on whether or not the rule is “tantamount to a rule of 
non-enforceability of arbitration agreements.”25  Rather, the 
plurality was persuaded by research which demonstrated that state 
courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement 
unconscionable as opposed to other contracts.26  The plurality also 
noted that, although California’s “rule does not require class-wide 
arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it 
ex post,” thus defeating the purposes of the FAA.27 
 
                                                                                                    
of another.”  Under these circumstances, such 
waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced.   
 
Id. at 162-63. 
24AT&T identified three principles from Discover Bank that it contended 
courts applied differently to arbitration agreements than to other 
contracts: (1) the effect on third parties; (2) the timing of the 
unconscionability decisions; and (3) the shock the conscience standard.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 
( 2011). 
25
 Id. at 39. 
26
 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
27
 Id. at 1750.  The Court discussed three characteristics of class 
arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes of the FAA and hinder 
the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality 
and speed; (2) a requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an 
increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review.  Id. at 1751-
52.  Although the plurality expressly included the procedural expediency 
of arbitration as one of the FAA’s purposes with which the Discover 
Bank rule interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter 
decision in which it specifically “reject[s] the suggestion that the 
overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious resolution 
of claims.”  Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
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 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion was fueled by a singular 
distrust of class arbitration, a distrust that also appeared in the 
Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp.28  In contrast, the dissent claimed that class proceedings are 
necessary to protect against small-value claims falling through the 
cracks of the legal system.29  Justice Scalia responded to the 
dissent’s concern by stating that “States cannot require a procedure 
that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for 
unrelated reasons.”30     
 
 Justice Thomas agreed with the result, but on slightly 
different grounds.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas 
reasoned that the savings clause of the FAA permits exceptions to 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements only for defenses that 
“relate[] to the making of the [arbitration] agreement.”31  Because 
the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the making of the 
arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§2 and 4, 
Justice Thomas concluded that it is preempted by the FAA.  While 
Justice Thomas’ interpretation of FAA §2 differed from prior 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and was not briefed or advocated by 
the parties, his vote was necessary for the 5-4 reversal.  Thus, his 
opinion, which arguably rests on narrower grounds than the 
plurality’s, may be considered controlling for future cases. 
 
There seems to be little doubt that this decision will have 
an adverse impact on consumer arbitration, as it effectively 
eliminates class arbitration as a procedural method of aggregating 
low value claims that are subject to an otherwise enforceable 
arbitration agreement.  However, if courts construe the decision 
more narrowly as preempting only California’s “Discover Bank 
rule,” rather than unconscionability rules nationally, the decision 
                                                 
28
 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
29
 Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
30
 Id. at 1753. 
31
 Id. at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting FAA § 4). 
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won’t have quite the broad-reaching impact predicted by some 
commentators.32  In the end, Congressional action may be the only 
way to preserve class arbitration. 
 
C. Waiver 
 
While federal courts tout the strong national policy 
favoring arbitration and the enforcement of arbitration agreements, 
they disfavor disputants who appear to be using that national 
policy to manipulate the court system and prejudice adverse 
parties.  In recent years, they have embraced the waiver defense – 
a claim that one party to an arbitration clause has waived its right 
to arbitrate based on conduct in parallel litigation.  As discussed 
below, the Supreme Court appears headed to decide the scope of 
the waiver defense next term. 
 
Courts generally find a party has waived its right to 
arbitration “when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices 
the opposing party.”33  While the waiver test varies slightly among 
the federal circuits, courts typically consider factors such as: (1) 
the time elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request 
for arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including 
                                                 
32
 See, e.g., Sarah Cole, “Continuing the Discussion of the AT&T v. 
Concepcion Decision: Implications for the Future,” posting to ADR Prof 
Blog, http://www. indisputably.org/?p=2312 (Apr. 27, 2011) (“It would 
appear that the era of class arbitration is over before it really ever began – 
unless Congress can be persuaded to amend the FAA to permit class 
arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where consumers 
are unlikely to have practical recourse to a remedy through traditional 
bilateral arbitration”); Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back Mandatory 
Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 28, 2011 (quoting 
lawyer for Concepcions as stating “’[t]he decision will make it harder for 
people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of claims that 
stem from corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful 
compensation’”). 
33
 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., No. 09-
2904-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9358, at *2 (2d Cir. May 7, 2010).   
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substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party 
opposing arbitration.34  Prejudice “refers to the inherent unfairness 
– in terms of delay, expense or damage to a party’s legal position – 
that occurs when the party’s opponent forces it to litigate an issue 
and later seeks to arbitrate that same issue.”35  
  
 A recent case involving a FINRA member firm illustrates 
the lower courts’ approach to the waiver defense.  In Louisiana 
Stadium Exposition District v. Merrill Lynch,36 the Second 
Circuit refused to reverse the district court’s denial of a motion to 
compel arbitration on the ground that plaintiff Louisiana Stadium 
Exposition District (“LSED”) had waived its right to enforce the 
pre-dispute arbitration clause.  LSED initiated identical 
proceedings in Louisiana state court and the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana against Financial Guaranty 
Insurance Company, and, shortly thereafter, added claims against 
three separate Merrill Lynch entities, including Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (“MLPFS”), the ultimate sole 
defendant.  Eleven months after these filings, LSED moved to 
compel arbitration against MLPFS.37 
 
 The court considered the three National Union factors in 
its waiver analysis.  While acknowledging that no factor by itself is 
dispositive in finding waiver, the court specifically singled out the 
                                                 
34
 See Id.   
35
 Id. (citing In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162-63 
(2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted)). 
36
 626 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2010). 
37
 During that eleven-month time period, defendants (1) filed a motion to 
remove the state court action to federal court; (2) filed a motion to 
transfer the case to the Southern District of New York; (3) moved to stay 
the proceedings in Louisiana federal court pending the decision of a 
Multidistrict Litigation Panel to centralize in one district four related 
cases pending against defendants in other districts; (4) submitted to 
LSED a nineteen-page letter identifying all the perceived deficiencies in 
the second amended complaint; (5) filed an answer to the third amended 
complaint; and (6) began work on a motion to dismiss.  Id. at 159.  
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third factor, proof of prejudice, as the “key to a waiver analysis.”38  
The Second Circuit found both procedural and substantive 
prejudice caused by LSED’s delay in moving to compel 
arbitration.  Procedurally, in addition to MLPFS’s spending of 
significant resources in its motion practice to date, the court found 
that LSED had only pursued arbitration after MLPFS had 
submitted a detailed letter addressing perceived deficiencies in 
LSED’s second amended complaint, and again, only after LSED 
had unsuccessfully attempted to defeat the motion to transfer the 
case to the Southern District of New York.   
 
 Substantively, the court found that MLPFS would be 
prejudiced by the preemption of consideration on the “inevitable 
motion for judgment on the pleadings which was plainly 
foreshadowed by the detailed deficiency letter.”39  In short, by 
waiting for MLPFS to submit answers to LSED’s amended 
complaints and receive the detailed deficiency letter, LSED 
obtained significant benefit which would not have been available 
in an arbitration proceeding.  By denying LSED’s motion to 
compel arbitration, the Second Circuit reinforced its reluctance to 
allow litigants to invoke arbitration clauses only after litigation has 
not gone their way.   
 
Not surprisingly, in light of the increase in waiver cases 
surrounding arbitration, the Supreme Court granted certiorari this 
term to consider – for the first time – the scope of the waiver 
defense.  In Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A,40 the Court 
agreed to consider whether, under the FAA, prejudice is a required 
element of the waiver defense.  In the opinion below, the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding that 
                                                 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 160. 
40
 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
 13
Citibank had waived its right to arbitrate a claim brought by Stok 
& Associates, P.A.41   
 
Stok is a law firm that had deposited a large check from a 
client into its Citibank bank account.42  Citibank discovered the 
check was actually a forgery and removed the funds from Stok’s 
account.43  A dispute arose concerning Citibank’s actions, and Stok 
filed a complaint in Florida state court alleging various state law 
causes of action.44  About six weeks later, Citibank answered the 
complaint without reference to the pre-dispute arbitration clause in 
the bank’s customer agreement with Stok.45  Within a few weeks, 
Stok served an offer of judgment and a discovery request on 
Citibank, and filed a reply to the answer and a notice of readiness 
with the state court.46  Less than one month after it filed its answer, 
Citibank sent a letter to Stok electing arbitration, which Stok 
rejected.47  The next day, Citibank filed a motion to compel 
arbitration in state court, but then withdrew that motion and 
instead filed a petition to compel arbitration in federal district court 
for the Southern District of Florida.48  The state court then stayed 
discovery for 60 days in the pending resolution of the federal court 
action, and removed the case from the trial docket.49 
 
The federal district court denied Citibank’s petition to 
compel arbitration on the ground advanced by Stok – that Citibank 
had waived its right to elect arbitration because of its participation 
                                                 
41
 Citibank, N.A. v. Stok & Associates, P.A., 387 Fed. Appx. 921 (11th 
Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1556 (2011). 
42
 Id. at 922. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at . 
47
 Id. at 922-23. 
48
 Id. at 923. 
49
 Id. 
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in the state court action.50  In its decision, the district court applied 
the Eleventh Circuit’s two-prong waiver test, which required the 
movant to show the waiving party acted inconsistently with its 
right to arbitration and its actions prejudiced the moving party.  
Citibank appealed.51  The Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground 
that, even if Stok met its burden of showing that Citibank acted 
inconsistently with its right to arbitration, it had not demonstrated 
that Citibank’s conduct prejudiced Stok.52 
 
Stok then sought review in the Supreme Court, arguing 
that there is a conflict among the circuits as to whether prejudice is 
a necessary element of the arbitration waiver analysis.53  Stok 
argued that a majority of circuits (nine) required a showing of 
prejudice, and a minority of circuits (three) did not.54  Stok also 
argued that the Court should rule that no showing of prejudice 
should be required, as such a requirement violates long-standing 
principles of common law contract.55  Citibank filed a very brief 
opposition (five pages) to the Petition, arguing only that there was 
no conflict in the circuits, as even the three circuits that did not 
explicitly include prejudice as a prong of its formal waiver test did 
consider prejudice as one factor in the overall analysis.56 
 
Since the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it appears the 
Court concluded that the circuits were indeed split on this issue.  
Thus, the issue is quite simple and clearly crystallized before the 
Court:  Should courts require a showing of prejudice before 
concluding that a party has waived its right to arbitration?   
                                                 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 924. 
52
 Id. at 924-25. 
53
 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 
2010 WL 4090959, *6-7 (Oct. 14, 2010). 
54
 Id., *7-14. 
55
 Id., *15-31. 
56
 See generally Brief Opposing Writ of Certiorari, Stok & Assocs. P.A. 
v. Citibank N.A., 2011 WL 63537 (Jan. 5,  2011). 
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Why did the Court take this case?  The circuit courts 
themselves have not acknowledged that a conflict exists among 
them on the waiver question.  Moreover, the Court’s FAA 
jurisprudence instructs lower courts to resolve questions of 
arbitrability in favor of arbitration – which would suggest 
requiring the party resisting arbitration to make a strong showing 
before finding that a party seeking arbitration had waived its right 
to arbitration.  This strong showing presumably would stem from, 
in part, prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.  Third, the facts 
in this case do not cry out for a finding of prejudice.  As the 
Eleventh Circuit noted in its opinion, courts that have found 
prejudice to the party opposing arbitration were faced with far 
more compelling facts: litigation activities for several years, rather 
than the few weeks present in Stok; and motion practice and 
extensive discovery requiring the party opposing arbitration to 
incur substantial legal fees and other litigation costs, unlike the 
relatively brief reply to answer and other litigation documents that 
Stok filed and served in the intervening weeks in this case.  Thus, 
even if the Court were to conclude that prejudice is a requirement 
before finding an arbitration waiver, no prejudice was present here, 
as the circuit court concluded.   
 
On the other hand, if the Court rules that prejudice is not 
required, this is not a case that plainly calls out for application of 
the waiver doctrine, as Citibank’s conduct in the five-week time 
period at issue was arguably not even inconsistent with its right to 
arbitration.  Finally, Citibank, a national banking institution with 
substantial litigation resources, barely opposed Stok’s certiorari 
petition, suggesting even Citibank did not think the issues on 
appeal were ripe for Supreme Court intervention. 
 
Finally, even if the Supreme Court affirms the Eleventh 
Circuit and retains the prejudice prong of the waiver test, the 
Eleventh Circuit had remanded the case to the district court for 
 16
consideration of Stok’s other arbitrability arguments opposing the 
motion to compel arbitration.  Thus, victory in the Supreme Court 
would not result in an automatic grant of Citibank’s petition to 
compel arbitration.  It would only ensure a date back in district 
court for consideration of Stok’s other arguments opposing the 
petition. 
 
D. Arbitrability of Federal Statutory Claim 
 
 Since its watershed decision in Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon57 that federal securities law claim are 
arbitrable, the Supreme Court has held consistently that plaintiffs 
could vindicate their rights arising under federal statutes in 
arbitration, and thus federal statutory claims were arbitrable as a 
matter of public policy.  In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,58 
the Court accepted a second arbitration case for next term, and 
agreed to resolve a circuit split on the question of whether claims 
arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1679 et seq.(“CROA”), are arbitrable.   
 
 The Ninth Circuit had decided in the opinion below that 
Congress intended to preclude arbitration of claims arising under 
the CROA, a consumer protection statute, when it provided 
consumers with a “right to sue” violators of the prohibitions in the 
statute.59  Because that Ninth Circuit decision conflicted with 
opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court 
granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit split.   
  
 What is notable is that many claims arising under the 
CROA are pursued in class actions, as they typically are too small 
for consumers to bring them individually.  Since the Court this 
                                                 
57
 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
58
 79 U.S.L.W. 3442, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3404 (May 2, 2011). 
59
 Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
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term effectively eliminated class arbitration of consumer protection 
claims in Concepcion, the stakes are quite high for consumers.  A 
decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit holding that CROA claims are 
arbitrable could eliminate the ability of many consumers to 
vindicate their CROA statutory rights.  
 
II. Notable Lower Federal Court Decisions
A. Challenges to Arbitrability  
 
1. Was there an enforceable arbitration 
agreement? 
 
 Before a court can grant a motion to compel arbitration 
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties 
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement.  In 
Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp.,60 the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered whether a brokerage firm customer’s alleged 
limited understanding of the English language precluded a 
“meeting of the minds” with respect to the customer agreement 
which contained the pre-dispute arbitration clause.  Plaintiff Alfred 
Janiga, a Polish immigrant, sued his broker, Weislaw Hessek, a 
registered representative of Questar Capital (who also happened to 
be Janiga’s brother), Hessek’s financial services company, and 
Questar Capital in federal district court in Illinois to recover 
investment losses.  Questar moved to compel arbitration, but 
Janiga resisted on the ground that, inter alia, he did not understand 
the customer agreement and saw only one page of it.61  While the 
Court of Appeals acknowledged Janiga’s contention that all of his 
communications with Hessek were in Polish, the court also 
remarked that Janiga had lived and worked in Illinois for more 
                                                 
60
 615 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2010). 
61
 Id. at 739. 
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than twenty years and was a principal of a company specializing in 
residential and commercial remodeling.62   
 
 The Seventh Circuit found that a valid arbitration clause 
existed, reasoning that Janiga’s signature on the customer account 
agreement, which he admitted he gave voluntarily, “objectively 
demonstrated his assent to the contract.”63  The court noted that the 
“unambiguous” arbitration clause was in all capital letters, just 
above Janiga’s signature.64  Thus, Janiga entered into a valid 
arbitration agreement with Questar.   
 
 Investors whose primary language is not English beware: 
the Court of Appeals’ lack of sympathy, and perhaps even disdain, 
for Janiga’s alleged limited understanding of English is palpable in 
the opinion.  At least according to this decision, investors who sign 
a customer agreement, whether or not they can show they are 
capable of understanding it, are bound to its terms. 
  
2. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule 
12200? 
 
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, respondents 
may resist arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a 
“customer” of the FINRA member firm within the meaning of 
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 
12200.  That rule provides that a FINRA member firm must 
arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is 
between a customer and a member or associated person of a 
member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the business 
activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”65 
 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 737-38. 
63
 Id. at 743. 
64
 Id.  
65
 FINRA R. 12200. 
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The Second Circuit recently contributed to the growing 
body of circuit court opinions interpreting FINRA Rule 12200.  In 
UBS Securities, LLC v. Voegeli,66 the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting 
Swiss investors from arbitrating securities fraud claims against 
UBS Securities, Inc.  Defendants were Swiss citizens who were 
seed investors in HealtheTech, Inc., a company for which UBS 
acted as a financial advisor and underwriter in its initial public 
offering.67  When HealtheTech’s post-IPO stock value declined, 
the Swiss investors filed an arbitration claim against UBS alleging, 
inter alia, securities fraud.68   
 
A FINRA arbitration panel rejected UBS’ claim that the 
Swiss investors, who did not purchase their HealtheTech securities 
through a brokerage account at UBS, were not its “customers,” and 
declined to halt the arbitration.69  UBS then sought injunctive relief 
in the district court for the Southern District of New York, on the 
grounds that defendants had never been “customers” of UBS, as 
required by FINRA Rule 12200.70  The district court issued a 
permanent injunction, finding both irreparable harm and success 
on the merits.71  The district court noted that parties will not 
become “customers” under FINRA’s Code of Arbitration 
Procedure merely because they were shareholders of a company 
that a broker-dealer advised in connection with an IPO.72 
 
The Second Circuit affirmed the issuance of the injunction, 
agreeing with the district court that the Swiss investors were not 
customers of UBS nor did they have a contract requiring 
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 405 Fed. Appx. 550 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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 UBS Securities, LLC v. Voegeli, 684 F. Supp.2d 351, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).   
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 Id. at 352-53. 
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 Id. at 353. 
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 Id. at 354-56. 
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arbitration.73  The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that “[b]eing forced to arbitrate a claim one did 
not agree to arbitrate constitutes an irreparable harm for which 
there is no adequate remedy at law.”74 
 
3. Are “collective actions” arbitrable under 
FINRA Rule 12204/13204? 
A federal district court in the Southern District of New 
York, in Velez v. Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp.,75 
addressed the issue of whether the class arbitration ban under 
FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure extends to collective 
actions.  Silva Alexander Velez, an employee of FINRA member 
Perrin Holden & Davenport Capital Corp. (“Perrin”), sued Perrin 
alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and 
New York’s Labor Law on behalf of himself and similarly situated 
brokers employed or formerly employed by Perrin.  Velez asked 
the district court to designate the suit as a “collective action” under 
the FLSA, and to designate his state law claims as a class action. 
 
Perrin subsequently moved to dismiss the action, or 
alternatively, to compel FINRA arbitration of the FLSA claims 
under FAA § 3 and pursuant to the arbitration clause in the 
“Account Executive At-Will Employment Agreement.”  Although 
Perrin could not seek arbitration of the state law claims, because 
FINRA Rule 13204 explicitly prohibits the arbitration of “class 
action claims,” Perrin argued that collective actions are separate 
and distinct from class action claims, and thus the FLSA claims 
were arbitrable.  Velez contended that FINRA Rule 13204 should 
be interpreted to encompass collective actions as well as class 
action claims. 
                                                 
73
 405 Fed. Appx. at 552. 
74
 Id. (citing Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 
125, 129 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
75
 10 Civ. 3735, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16678 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2011). 
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Following other district courts that have considered the 
issue,76 the Velez court ruled that collective actions should be 
considered separate and distinct from class action claims.  
Although class actions and collective actions share similar 
characteristics, the court focused on one, and, in its opinion, 
significant, difference – the fact that class actions are opt-out 
actions while collective actions are opt-in actions.77  In an opt-out 
action, each member of the class must affirmatively act to remove 
himself from the action, but in an opt-in action, the members of the 
class must act in order to participate in the action.  Thus, in a 
collective action, the decision will “bind only similarly situated 
plaintiffs who have affirmatively consented to join the action.”78  
As a result, the district court compelled arbitration of plaintiffs’ 
FLSA claims. 
 
Notably, the court rejected opinion letters from FINRA 
staff members (including an Assistant General Counsel and the 
Director of Arbitration) construing collective actions as within the 
meaning of Rule 12304.79  The court refused to take those letters 
into account because FINRA – as well as the authors themselves – 
indicated that staff opinions are merely that – the personal opinions 
of those staff members who work for FINRA, and they do not bind 
FINRA or its Board.  The court noted that, if FINRA intends to 
prohibit collective actions, it may do so by amending its rules.   
 
The court’s refusal to give deference to FINRA staff 
opinion letters construing FINRA’s own Code of Arbitration 
                                                 
76
 See Gomez v. Brill Securities, Inc., No. 10 Civ.  3503, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 118162 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2010); Suschil v. Ameriprise Financial 
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(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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Procedure seems peculiar.  If the Supreme Court defers to FINRA 
arbitrators to construe FINRA’s eligibility rule,80 then why 
shouldn’t a federal district court defer to FINRA’s Director of 
Arbitration to construe FINRA Rules 12204/13204?  
 
4. Can a nonsignatory be estopped from 
disclaiming the obligation to arbitrate? 
 
 Even when one party to a multiparty dispute did not sign 
an arbitration agreement, courts have, on rare occasion, compelled 
a nonsignatory to arbitrate under the doctrine of estoppel.  In the 
arbitration context, this doctrine generally requires a signatory to 
arbitrate (and not disclaim an obligation to arbitrate) claims with a 
nonsignatory when the nonsignatory’s claims are “inextricably 
intertwined” with the agreement signed by the signatory.   
 
 The Eighth Circuit considered this doctrine in the context 
of a raiding dispute between Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), not 
a FINRA member, and UMB Financial Services, Inc. (“UMB”), a 
FINRA member.81  Soon after five former BOA employees 
(financial advisors who brokered securities through Banc of 
America Investment Services (“BOAIS”)) joined UMB, BOA sued 
its former employees and UMB in federal court in Missouri 
alleging violations of the employees’ non-solicitation agreements.   
 
 In addition to pursuing various procedural maneuvers in 
the district court, UMB filed a FINRA arbitration claim against 
both BOA and BOAIS.82  BOA refused to arbitrate against UMB, 
on the grounds that, unlike BOAIS and UMB, it is not a FINRA 
member.  The district court denied UMB’s motion to compel 
arbitration and enjoined the parties from arbitrating pending 
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 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
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 Bank of America, N.A. v. UMB Financial Services, Inc., 618 F.3d 906 
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resolution of various issues before the district court.  After further 
proceedings, the district court granted BOA’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction, restraining three of its former employees 
from further violating their active non-solicitation agreements, and 
restraining UMB from doing business with customers obtained in 
violation of those agreements.83 
 
 UMB and the former employees appealed, arguing that the 
district court erred in refusing to compel BOA and BOAIS to 
arbitrate before FINRA.  UMB argued that BOA should be 
estopped from disclaiming the obligation to arbitrate because its 
claims are “inextricably intertwined with any claims BOAIS might 
bring against the appellants and because BOA seeks to benefit 
from its association with BOAIS.”84  The Eighth Circuit rejected 
the estoppel argument, because, unlike the typical estoppel 
scenario, the nonsignatory here is not the party pursuing 
arbitration.  The appellate court further held that BOA is not a 
third party beneficiary of BOAIS’ arbitration agreements (Forms 
U-4) with the BOA former employees.85  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s refusal to compel BOA to 
arbitrate.   
 
 Estoppel remains a valid exception to the requirement of 
an arbitration agreement, but courts typically limit its use to the 
situation where a nonsignatory seeks to compel a signatory to 
arbitrate claims inextricably intertwined with an arbitration 
agreement.  Signatories cannot draw in nonsignatories to an 
arbitration simply because the claims are related; nonsignatories 
have to indicate a willingness to arbitrate. 
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 Id. at 910. 
84
 Id. at 912. 
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B. Res Judicata Effect of Arbitral Award 
  
 The First Circuit, in FleetBoston Financial Corp. v. Alt,86 
recently considered the res judicata effect of an arbitral award.  
The dispute arose out of employment claims of Eric Alt (lead 
claimant) and forty-one additional former employees of the broker-
dealer Robertson Stephens, Inc. (RSI).  Claimants alleged various 
theories of liability and sought over $140 million in damages from 
Respondents RSI, RSI’s owner, Robertson Stephens Group, Inc. 
(RSGI), and RSGI’s owner, FleetBoston Financial Corporation 
(Fleet).  Arbitration hearings which lasted more than two years 
resulted in an award to twenty-seven claimants of over $14 
million.87  
  
 While the arbitration was in progress, RSI, RSGI and Fleet 
filed an action in Massachusetts state court against the Alt 
claimants seeking a declaratory judgment and a stay of the 
arbitration as to RSGI and Fleet, claiming they were not members 
of the NYSE and did not agree to arbitrate.88  After removal, the 
district court for the District of Massachusetts declined the stay 
request, choosing to stay its own proceeding pending the result of 
the arbitration.89 
   
 Following the award, both claimants and respondents 
sought to remove the stay, which resulted in the district court 
confirming the arbitral award.90  The Alt claimants also amended 
their initial counterclaim to add claims related to deferred 
compensation in the form of a cash equivalent plan (CEP) and a 
restricted stock unit plan (RSU).  Claimants contended the CEP 
and RSU claims were both unresolved and could be brought 
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against RSGI and Fleet in a new action.91  Fleet and RSGI moved 
for summary judgment on the grounds these claims were included 
in the arbitral award and “‘barred as a matter of law by reason of 
claim preclusion, judicial estoppel, invited error, and payment.’”92  
The district court granted the motion, and the Alt claimants 
appealed. 
 
 The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that 
the arbitral award included the CEP and RSU claims.  The Court 
of Appeals noted that “[a]n arbitration award generally has res 
judicata effect as to all claims heard by the arbitrators.”  The 
Court concluded, “[i]n light of the manner in which Alt presented 
the RSU and CEP claims in its Amended Statement of Claims, the 
evidence Alt presented to the panel, and the arbitral award itself, it 
is most reasonable to interpret the award’s scope –‘all of the claims 
between the parties’ – to include all of Alt’s CEP and RSU 
claims.”94   
 
 Applying the doctrine of res judicata to arbitration awards 
serves the same purpose as in judicial proceedings – it prevents 
costly re-litigation of the same issues and provides closure.  
Because the Alt claimants took advantage of the opportunity to 
litigate their claims during arbitration, the court saw no unfairness 
in its decision.95   
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C. Post-Award Review  
 
1. Arbitrator Bias 
 
 The Seventh Circuit recently considered whether an 
arbitrator’s “reputational interest” in being appointed again 
impacts his neutrality.  In Trustmark Insurance Co. v. Hancock 
Life Insurance Co.,96 Hancock Life Insurance Co. (“Hancock”) 
and Trustmark Insurance Co. (“Trustmark”) executed a 
reinsurance contract which included a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause calling for a tripartite arbitration panel.97  Hancock 
appointed Mark Gurevitz as its party arbitrator. 
 
 After Trustmark lost the arbitration and Hancock 
confirmed the award in U.S. District Court in Illinois, Trustmark 
refused to honor retrocessional reinsurance contract billings  
involved in the first arbitration that were due to Hancock based on 
the award.98  Trustmark argued that the confirmed award governed 
all of the parties’ dealings, and thus any billings subsequent to the 
award were not valid.99   
  
 After initiating a new arbitration to resolve the subsequent 
disputed bills, Hancock named Gurevitz as its party-appointed 
arbitrator once again.  Hancock argued that the prior award should 
be dispositive in the new dispute, but Trustmark contended that the 
second panel should not consider the first award at all due to the 
existence of a confidentiality agreement reached during the first 
proceeding.  The second panel ruled that the confidentiality 
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agreement did not preclude the arbitrators themselves from 
considering the prior award.100 
  
 Before substantive hearings took place, Trustmark sought 
an injunction in the district court, arguing that Gurevitz was not a 
“disinterested” arbitrator as required by the arbitration agreement’s 
appointment procedures.  The district court ruled that Gurevitz was 
not “disinterested” due to his knowledge of the prior arbitration 
and the fact that he could be called as a fact witness about those 
proceedings. 
  
 The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the term 
“disinterested” in the context of an adjudication means “lacking a 
financial or other personal stake in the outcome.”101  The court 
found that Gurevitz did not, in fact, have any stake in the outcome 
of the arbitration beyond a “reputational interest” – the incentive to 
rule in favor of the party that appointed him to make it more likely 
to be appointed by that party in a future arbitration.102  Because 
potential future employment is an interest that is “endemic to 
arbitration,” arbitrators cannot be dismissed on the ground that 
they may be inclined to support the party that appointed them.103  
Rather, “[w]hen one party is entitled to choose its own arbitrator, 
and in doing so follows all contractual requirements, a court ought 
not abet the other side’s strategy to eject its opponent’s choice.”104 
 
 Because FINRA arbitrators also have a reputational 
interest in being appointed by repeat players in securities 
arbitrations, this case impacts the ability of claimants to argue that 
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arbitrators selected and favored by broker-dealers or brokers are 
not neutral. 
 
 In addition to arbitrator neutrality requirements set forth in 
parties’ arbitration agreements and/or forum rules, the FAA 
authorizes a court to vacate an arbitration award, inter alia, "where 
there was evident partiality …in the arbitrators…,”105 or for “other 
misbehavior [by arbitrators] by which the rights of any party have 
been prejudiced.”106  Just as this chapter went to press, the Second 
Circuit handed down a decision interpreting these sections in the 
context of a FINRA arbitration award.  In STMicroelectronics, 
N.V. v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA), LLC,107 Credit Suisse 
moved to vacate an award against it for more than $400 million 
arising out of its sale of auction-rate securities (“ARS”) to 
STMicroelectronics (“ST”), a semiconductor manufacturer, whose 
cyclical business required it to keep a lot of cash or cash 
equivalents on hand to meet its needs.  When the ARS market 
froze in August 2007, the ARS owned by ST failed at auction, 
rendering them significantly lower in value.108 
 
 ST filed a FINRA arbitration claim against Credit Suisse 
in February 2008 alleging, inter alia, federal securities fraud, 
common law fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and failure to supervise.  During the arbitration, Credit Suisse 
unsuccessfully sought to remove one of the arbitrators, who often 
testified as a financial expert, for purportedly failing to disclose 
details about his prior testimony on behalf of investor-claimants.    
After the arbitration panel awarded ST more than $400 million in 
compensatory damages, financing fees, attorneys’ fees and 
interest, Credit Suisse moved to vacate the award on the grounds 
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of “evident partiality,” arbitrator “misbehavior,” and “manifest 
disregard of the law.”109   
 
 The district court (SDNY) refused to vacate the award, and 
also refused to partially offset the award by just under $75 million 
following ST’s post-arbitration sale of the ARS to a third party.   
 
 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court 
with respect to the award vacatur, except modified the amount of 
the compensatory damages to account for the $75 million offset 
and corresponding interest.  On the issue of arbitrator bias, the 
Court of Appeals noted that Credit Suisse had rightly abandoned 
its arguments under the evident partiality prong of the FAA, 
because it could not meet the very high burden of showing a 
failure to disclose facts demonstrating partiality, which the court 
defined as a “relationship with a party, a lawyer or another 
arbitrator.” Rather, Credit Suisse alleged only that the arbitrator 
had an unfavorable “predisposition.”110 
 
 The court then rejected Credit Suisse’s contention that the 
arbitrator’s disclosure report was misleading in violation of 
FINRA rules.  Notably, the appellate court faulted Credit Suisse 
for not having taken discovery on the issue of the arbitrator’s 
background, which Second Circuit precedent would have 
permitted.111  The fact that the arbitrator’s disclosures complied 
with FINRA’s own written “explication” of its disclosure 
requirements persuaded the appellate court further that the 
arbitrator had not engaged in “other misbehavior” within the 
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meaning of section 10(a)(3).112  The court concluded that the 
arbitrator’s alleged predisposition on issues of law could not be the 
basis for vacatur because, as the industry arbitrator, his prior 
testimony on and expertise with related issues of law is precisely 
what qualifies him to be an industry arbitrator.113 
 
 The Court of Appeals then addressed Credit Suisse’s 
second argument for vacatur: that the panel must have manifestly 
disregarded the law114 applicable to ST’s fraud claim because it did 
not enforce against ST the clause in the parties’ agreement 
requiring ST to object to trade confirmations within two days and 
account statements within ten days,115 and because it ignored the 
“reasonable reliance” element of fraud.  The Second Circuit 
soundly rejected this alternative vacatur ground, reasoning that: (1) 
the Modern Settings defense is not a “well-defined, explicit, and 
clearly applicable” rule as required by the first prong of the 
manifest disregard standard; (2) because the element of 
“reasonable reliance” requires an inherently fact-specific analysis, 
and Credit Suisse cited all factually distinguishable precedent, 
Credit Suisse could not show that the panel disregarded factually 
analogous precedent; and (3) even if the panel had disregarded 
these valid defenses to ST’s fraud claim, the award did not contain 
reasons, so the entire award could have been based on one of ST’s 
non-fraud claims.116  Finally, the Second Circuit reduced the award 
by $75 million – the amount ST received from the liquidation of its 
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ARS, plus the corresponding amount of interest due on that 
money.117 
 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, particularly to securities arbitration aficionados, is its 
hostility to Credit Suisse for trying to avoid some of the 
consequences of the very arbitration process it imposed on its 
customer:   
 
We note again that Credit Suisse could have chosen to 
permit its customers to resolve disputes in the courts, 
where legal issues such as these could be authoritatively 
resolved.  It deliberately chose, however, to insist on a 
forum in which issues are resolved less formally, without 
the necessity for the adjudicator to explain its precise 
reasoning or the availability of appellate tribunals to 
review and assess that reasoning.  Having chosen that 
process, with its attendant expedition and lower cost, 
Credit Suisse may not now impose on its adversary the 
very formalities it elected to eschew, simply because it 
does not like the outcome of the process.118 
 
Ouch! 
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2. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
 Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C.  v. Mattel, Inc.119 that parties to an arbitration agreement 
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an 
award under the FAA, the lower courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.120  Since last year’s Arbitration Law 
Update, the circuit split continues: 
 
• The Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have acknowledged 
the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard” ground 
of vacatur.121 
   
• The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly determined 
that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur 
ground.122   
 
• The First and Eighth Circuits have addressed “manifest 
disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.123 
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• The Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have expressly 
declined to address the issue.124   
 
3. Exceeding Powers 
 
 While the confusion over the “manifest disregard” ground 
of review persists, losing parties in arbitration continue to 
challenge arbitration awards on grounds specified in the FAA.  In 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Whitney, the 
Tenth Circuit considered whether an arbitration panel exceeded its 
powers under FAA § 10(a)(4) in interpreting the terms of a 
contract, when it considered whether someone possessed the legal 
authority to assign beneficiaries to an account, and when it 
awarded legal fees to the Appellee.  
 
 The dispute between the parties stemmed from two 
accounts that were opened by the Appellant’s sister, Suzanne, 
following the death of their mother.  Suzanne decided to have her 
50% share of their mother’s two IRA accounts placed into two 
beneficiary-controlled accounts with the Appellee bank, Merrill 
Lynch.  When opening the accounts, Suzanne was required to fill 
out a standard “Merrill Lynch Client Relation Agreement (CRA),” 
which was used to specify the type of account and assign 
beneficiaries.  When filling out the agreement, Suzanne assigned 
two beneficiaries to the first account, while assigning none to the 
second.   
  
 Following Suzanne’s death, the Appellant asserted that 
under the CRA and Oklahoma law, the second account which was 
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assigned no beneficiaries belonged to their mother’s estate, and 
should revert to her heirs, which was the Appellant.126  During 
arbitration, the panel relied on a format flaw contained in the CRA, 
and determined that this flaw was the reason no beneficiaries were 
named to the second account.  Based on this determination, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the panel did 
not exceed its power in making a factual determination that 
Suzanne intended for the beneficiaries named in account one to 
also be assigned to account two.127 
 
 Appellant also argued that Suzanne never had legal 
authority to name beneficiaries to either of the accounts, because 
“when Suzanne inherited IRA accounts from her mother, she 
elected to retain her ‘beneficiary’ status and not become the 
‘owner’ of the accounts.”128   Based on this assertion, the 
Appellant contended that Internal Revenue Service regulations 
forbid Suzanne from assigning beneficiaries to the accounts, as this 
right was reserved to the true owner, which was their mother.  The 
panel disagreed, and instead relied on an expert witness’ testimony 
that an IRA becomes the account of a designated beneficiary upon 
the death of its owner.  Thus, Suzanne became the owner of her 
share of the IRA, and was free to assign beneficiaries at her will.  
As a result, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling 
that the panel did not exceed its powers in making this 
determination.129 
 
 Finally, the Appellant argued that the panel exceeded its 
power in awarding legal fees to the Appellee in the absence of 
supporting detail, purportedly required by Oklahoma law.  
However, because the district court had identified Oklahoma 
precedent which provided an exception to the documentation 
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requirement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the arbitration panel was not acting “arbitrary, 
capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable” in awarding 
fees and costs to the Appellee.130    
 
II. A Few Notable State Court Decisions 
 
A. Statutes of Limitation 
 
 Securities arbitration practitioners are routinely faced with 
the question of whether statutes of limitation are applicable in 
arbitration.  This past year, a Florida court joined the growing 
number of jurisdictions that have held that statutes of limitation 
apply to actions in court, but not arbitrations.  In Phillips v. 
Raymond James Financial Services, Inc.,131 the court was tasked 
with determining the timeliness of arbitration claims for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty (based on suitability and 
failure to supervise claims), as well as statutory fraud under 
Florida’s securities statute.132  Following a Florida Supreme Court 
1995 precedent,133 the circuit court determined that Florida statutes 
of limitation do not apply to FINRA arbitration. 
 
B. Confidentiality 
 
 In Dever v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,134 a Massachusetts 
Superior Court overturned a confidentiality order imposed by a 
FINRA arbitration panel on First Amendment grounds.  Claimant 
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James Dever contended that the FINRA gag order, which required 
confidential treatment of all details of the twenty-day hearing’s 
testimony, documents and hearing transcripts, restricted him from 
clearing his reputation which allegedly had been tarred by the 
disclosures included on his Form U-5. 
 
 Parties to arbitration commonly enter into confidentiality 
agreements either in their arbitration clauses or during the 
discovery phase of the dispute.135  Although gag orders that bar 
parties from discussing a case while it is pending are not 
uncommon, Dever argued that a broad order imposing 
confidentiality after the case is heard is unprecedented.  For 
example, the Seventh Circuit, in Citizens First Nat’l Bank v. 
Cincinnati Ins. Co.,136 required “good cause” before sealing 
documents and presumed public access to those materials that did 
not meet this requirement.  The Court of Appeals suggested that 
courts have begun to resist “standardless, stipulated, permanent, 
frozen [and] overbroad blanket [confidentiality] order[s].”137 
 
 In Dever, Judge McIntyre stated that members of FINRA 
forums do not expect their proceedings to be cloaked in secrecy, 
and that arbitrators should not be able to conceal the proceedings 
under broad confidentiality orders.  Such orders, under McIntyre’s 
analysis, offend free speech protection under the First Amendment.   
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 This decision made clear that courts will not blindly 
enforce confidentiality orders, but will examine them to determine 
if they unlawfully restrict the constitutional rights of the parties 
involved.  It will be interesting to see how other courts begin 
treating confidentiality orders, and whether they adopt Judge 
McIntyre’s analysis. 
 
C. Post-Award Review   
 
 While the federal circuits are split as to whether manifest 
disregard of the law is a valid basis of vacatur (see supra, § II.D), 
some state courts still recognize that standard of review.  In 
Wiederhorn v. Merkin, a New York Supreme Court judge applied 
the manifest disregard standard to a challenge to a $1.75 million 
award arising out of a Madoff-related dispute.138 
 
 When Claimant moved to confirm the award, Respondent 
cross-moved to vacate the award on the grounds that the findings 
were “totally irrational” and in manifest disregard of the law.139  
The court acknowledged that New York courts recognize the 
FAA’s manifest disregard provision, but severely limit the doctrine 
by restricting its application to situations of “last resort limited to 
the rare occurrences of apparent ‘egregious impropriety’ on the 
part of the arbitrators, ‘where none of the provisions of the FAA 
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apply.’”140  This extreme deference to the arbitrators’ decision will 
be overcome only if the party moving for vacatur shows that: (1) 
the arbitrators had known of a governing legal principle; (2) they 
refused to apply or altogether ignored that principle; and (3) the 
ignored law was well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to 
the case at hand.141   
 
 In the case at hand, the court concluded that, due to a split 
in the Appellate Divisions within New York State on the 
applicable point of law, it could not find the arbitrators manifestly 
disregarded the law because the third element’s “well-defined” 
requirement could not be satisfied.  Significantly for securities 
arbitration practitioners, the court also upheld the arbitrators’ 
freedom to apply principles of equity and their own sense of the 
law when rendering an award.  In Wiederhorn, the majority of the 
tribunal stated clearly in its award that it based many of its 
decisions on principles of equity.  As a result, the trial court denied 
the motion for vacatur and confirmed the award. 
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